INTRODUCTION
When was the notion of market power defined? And how has it been explained in the history of economic thought? In this chapter, we distinguish four different fields of enquiry in which to seek a history of ideas on the causes of market power. The first concerns the history of the formal models of profit maximisation in imperfectly competitive markets; the second, competition policies in a historical perspective; the third, the theory of competition in economic thought; and the fourth, the development of the notion of entry barriers. This chapter is of a historiographical character and places this book within the existing panorama of the secondary literature. Moreover, it has been written in the conviction that in the study of economic thought one cannot restrict oneself to simply narrating a history, one must also have some very good reasons for doing so.
FIELDS OF ENQUIRY
The four possible fields of enquiry in which to seek the origins of the notion of monopoly power are to be found within the pre-history and history of industrial economics and competition policies. This is true insofar as market power is the characteristic feature of all imperfectly competitive markets, so the natural place to look to follow its historical 1 development is in these fields. Nevertheless, as we shall see, also the historiography of the theory of competition will provide various ideas for a history of the sources of market power.
The History of Formal Models
The first field of enquiry concerns the attempts to calculate equilibrium prices and quantities in imperfectly competitive markets. The history of these attempts has been reconstructed by many scholars, 2 who all agree on the fact that it began with the work of Cournot (1838), followed by Dupuit (1844), Bertrand (1883), Launhardt (1885), Auspitz and Lieben (1889), Edgeworth (1897), Bowley (1924) , Hotelling (1929) , Chamberlin (1933) and J. Robinson (1933) . 3 These formal models do not consider entry of new firms, and do not pay much attention to the causes of market power, often taking them as given. 4 These are the reasons why the historiography that focused on profit maximisation models in imperfectly competitive markets has little to say about the causes of monopoly power in economic thought.
The History of Competition Policies
The second field of enquiry concerns the history of the theory behind the two main competition policies, namely antitrust policy and regulation. 5 2 See, among others, , West (1978) , Stigler (1982) , Niehans (1990) , Ekelund and Hébert (1999) , Puu (2002, pp. 1-5). 3 The reason I stop at the 1930s is explained further on in section 1.3. 4 Modigliani for example writes that 'the impossibility of entry is frequently at least implicitly assumed in the analysis of oligopoly, following the venerable example of Cournot, with his owners of mineral wells ' (1958, p. 216) . And according to Ekelund and Hébert, among all the 'pioneers' they cite, 'Dupuit alone examined in detail the sources of monopoly' (1999, p. 19, my italics); I have already mentioned this in my Introduction. Clearly, in the models of monopolistic and imperfect competition the cause of market power is explicitly indicated in product differentiation (Hicks 1935) . See section 1.2.4.2. 5 'The main instruments of competition policy are: antitrust policy, the policy for the efficiency of financial markets, regulation, the production of public services, the policy for innovations and patents' (Grillo and Silva 1989, p. 501); here we restrict ourselves to considering the two main ones. Unless stated otherwise, the translations of quotations are my own.
power, 11 because its interest is limited merely to those kinds of behaviour 12 that generate market power by restraining competition. 13 The second reason is the following: if in the evaluation of illegal behaviour, the rule of reason approach is adopted, 14 judgement is based on the principle of reasonableness, according to which it is not enough that an action, to be condemned, restrains competition, it also has to restrain it unreasonably. By adopting this approach, therefore, an anticompetitive practice aiming at the acquisition of market power that, however, restrains competition 'reasonably', would not be condemned. In this context, the main causes of monopoly power for antitrust change according to whether such power is judged reasonable, which further explains why the historiography of ideas behind antitrust legislation cannot contain a general analysis of the causes of monopoly power. 15 The third reason is that the only economists who are believed to have influenced antitrust at its beginnings are Americans; 16 this cuts out all the economic thought which, starting from the latter part of the nineteenth century in the rest of the world, focused on the development of a good deal of thinking on antitrust policies.
11
For example, market power that all firms inevitably enjoy through the absence of perfect competition in actual markets is obviously not the object of antitrust enquiry, nor is that achieved due to merit, nor that deriving from natural monopolies. 12 The attention paid by antitrust to market share is explicable in that it is considered as evidence of behaviour that could have illegally generated market power. 13 And in a recent approach this restraint also has to be 'detrimental' (Motta 2004, p. xvii). A criticism of this approach is found in Grillo (2006) . See also the approach put forward by Etro (2006) . 14 In enacting antitrust legislation the rule of reason has been widely adopted. See Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) . The various meanings attributed to the rule of reason in the history of antitrust are examined in Grillo (2006) . 15 On the relationship between the character of the violations and market power from a different perspective, but one compatible with ours, see Krattenmaker, Lande and Salop (1987, p. 242) . 16 See the examination of the literature in Giocoli (2009). The author formulates convincing hypotheses on the history of antitrust in Europe, which is beyond our temporal horizon in that, as is well known, it has much more recent origins (the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957). For the debates on the issue of monopoly power in the case of predatory pricing in the history of American antitrust see Giocoli (2014).
Industrial regulation
Within this second field of enquiry we also need to use historical perspective for the theory of regulation policies. Nevertheless, since policies of this kind aim to intervene in industries characterised by natural monopoly, they are linked to just one of the causes of monopoly power, namely economies of scale, which are included in our reconstruction, but by no means make up the whole of it. 17
The Historiography on Competition
The third research path turns to the literature specifically devoted to the history of the notion of competition, with the idea of arriving at information indirectly on the non-legal sources of market power. 18 This is not an easy thing to do, because the historiography on competition in general does not raise the problem of implications for ideas about monopoly power, and because the two notions are not always antithetical. Only if competition is characterised by perfect elasticity of the firm's demand curve, is it antithetical to market power: the competition thus defined necessarily implies absence of monopoly power. In this case, the list of the conditions associated with perfect competition provides us with all the information we need on the causes of market power: the latter in fact emerges exclusively if one or more of these conditions do not occur. 19 Yet as we shall see, the notion of perfect competition was fully defined only in the 1930s. Before that, competition was treated as an activity, 20 and to compete meant to undertake strategies precisely to obtain monopoly power; that is, to set prices so as to make positive profits: 21 in this situation, there can clearly be no antithesis between competition and market power.
17
On the origins and history of the concept of natural monopoly see Mosca (2008) . 18 In this work, we do not deal with legal protection from competition, because the recognition of this kind of entry barrier has never been problematic, being simply attributed to the government.
19
See Machovec (1995, pp. 179-181) . Berta, Julien and Tricou (2012, pp. 10-11) note that these conditions are not normalised in the literature.
20
As a result, the term was applied to any kind of market structure. See MacNulty (1967, p. 397), Backhouse (1990, Which is a very different thing from assuming given prices and zero economic profit as in the model of perfect competition (MacNulty 1967, p. 399; 1968, p. 656 ).
The sources of monopoly power
On examining this literature to seek the causes of monopoly power we therefore have to be careful to distinguish between the two cases: whereas in the former the causes of market power coincide with the obstacles to perfect competition, in the latter the firm's behaviour in obtaining market power is in fact an expression of competition.
Competition in the classicals
We start with an examination of the literature on competition in the classicals with the aim of finding their views on the causes of monopoly power. Beyond the legal restraints, which as we have already said do not come within the scope of our present work, the uncovering of other sources of market power, such as limited knowledge, collusion, imperfect factor mobility and inelastic supply is down to Smith (1776). In addition, it is held that for Smith the number of rivals in a market was important for determining market power. 22 It is stated that to Bailey (1825) we owe the interesting analyses of 'monopolies' with restricted entry and one or more sellers, as well as that of markets in which the producers have a cost advantage over the new entrants; he also highlighted the role of potential competition. 23 Senior (1836) is cited for having worked on the impossibility of transferring capital from one use to another without incurring losses, and of the unavailability of information on profits; 24 at the same time, it is thought that for Senior the number of firms was unimportant. 25 J.S. Mill (1848) is remembered for having paid attention to consumers' 'custom'; 26 as far as the number of firms is concerned, the idea that 'concentration will inevitably lead to some "contrivance to raise prices" or some form of "combination among dealers"' 27 is attributed to J.S. Mill, as well as to Smith. Cairnes (1874) is described as interested specifically in cases of monopoly power within his 'non-competing groups ' To sum up, and in the light of the previous distinction, we can state that the classicals had singled out a series of causes from which they believed monopoly power for firms could derive: some of them (agreements, limited knowledge due to the withholding of information) are to be considered strategies to compete, 29 others (imperfect factor mobility, inelastic input supply, custom) were seen as real constraints on the competitive process. 30 The latter were however seen as temporary, but to this we shall be returning (section 3.1). On the importance of the number of firms for competition, as we have seen, there was no agreement.
Marginalist and neolassical competition
We will now seek the sources of monopoly power in the literature on competition in marginalist and neoclassical thought. 31 As we shall see, in that age the foundations were laid for the conception of competition as the market structure in which prices instantaneously converge to costs, without moreover abandoning the classical idea of competition as an activity, which we have just examined. 32 This is the reason why most of the economists dealt with in this section are different from those included in section 1.2.1 (The History of Formal Models). This is not the case for Cournot (1838) who, as we know, paid no attention to the conditions of entry, yet in the literature on competition he is cited for one aspect that also interests us here: his theory establishes that if the firms are few, they have market power. 33 Jevons (1871) is remembered for his 'law of indifference', 34 which characterises perfect markets. 35 Edgeworth's Mathematical Psychics (1881) is considered the first work to list certain conditions without which agents cannot compete or, to use his term, 29 Hart (2001, p. 3) recalls for example that for the classicals 'technological change was the natural result of economic competition'. 30 We do not share the idea that in the classicals' thinking the non-legal obstacles to competition were entirely absent. For example, Hovenkamp is being reductive when he sees in the classicals 'the absence of any notion of barrier to entry' ([1989b] 1991, p. 148).
31
For the distinction between these two categories see our Introduction. 32 We will come back to this later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 2. . We should also remember that Cournot is held not to have really believed that competition existed in most real markets. 34 Backhouse (1990, pp. 66-67); according to this law, in a market there cannot be two different prices for the same good. 'recontract': free communication, 36 divisibility of goods, 37 a large number of sellers. 38 As we know, Bertrand (1883) is known for his theory of price competition, 39 which makes the number of firms in the market irrelevant. Marshall (1890a, 1890b) confidently proposes that the 'race' of competition can take place, on the condition that there is sufficient knowledge and absence of agreements. 40 It has also been argued that Marshall's conception of competition left no room for long-run concerns. 41 Hadley (1896) Wicksell (1901) is also remembered for having traced the causes of monopoly in large overhead costs and joint supply, in price stability, and in location, 48 while H.C. Adams (1918) is considered among those who believed firm size to be the cause of market power. 49 Finally, the greatest effort to set down the conditions for perfect competition is down to Knight (1921b) , 50 and it should also be noted that he didn't believe in it. 51 It was precisely Knight who prepared the way for the reaction in the 1930s against the theory of perfectly competitive markets, 52 then initiated by Sraffa, and ironically it was Chamberlin 53 and Robinson 54 who definitively perfected this static notion. The 'principle of excluded strategy' having prevailed, 55 it is said that after this age every action undertaken to compete was considered proof of monopoly power. 56 We shall be returning to this statement (section 1.3.2).
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For Wicksell, 'There must be a uniform product, firms must be small in size and there must be constant returns to scale' (Backhouse 1990 
52
'It was the meticulous discussion in this work that did most to drive home to economists generally the austere nature of the rigorously defined concept and so prepared the way for the widespread reaction against it in the 1930's' (Stigler 1957 , p. 11); 'Knight highlighted the severely abstract character of perfect competition in such a way that led other theorists to hunt for more plausibly realistic models of market behaviour' (Dennis 1977, p. 270) . As can be seen, for the age examined here as well as for the classical age, we can divide the causes of market power into two categories: (i) those due to strategic behaviour (agreements, information withholding, product differentiation), and (ii) those owing to external factors (technology, indivisibility, inelastic input supply, custom), while the significance or otherwise of the number of firms remains controversial. 57 We also point out that, as the definition of the conditions for perfect competition gradually becomes more rigorous, it is denied that those conditions can be realised. 58 In the historiography focused on the notion of competition there is therefore interesting material for a history of the causes of market power. Further on (section 3) we will look much more closely at the consequences these ideas have for our research. For the moment, however, we shall restrict ourselves to noticing, together with most of the relevant secondary literature, that in this period there were several concepts of competition, and they co-existed side by side.
The History of the Notion of Entry Barriers
The fourth field of inquiry concerns the literature dealing with the way industrial economists of the past have answered the question, 'Which factors generate situations in which firms have market power; that is, in which they are able to set their prices?' 59 The findings of this literature overlap very little with those of the historiography focused on profitmaximisation models in non-competitive markets, as well as on antitrust For those who argue that monopoly power is generated exclusively by legal protection this question makes no sense. For example, certain exponents of the Chicago School state that 'firms cannot in general obtain or enhance monopoly power by unilateral action' (Posner 1979, p. 928). The Neo-Austrian School, basing itself on different methodological foundations, argues that 'Monopoly power […] is always associated with legal, third-party restraints on either business rivalry or cooperation, not with strictly free-market activity' (Armentano 1999, p. 18). and on competition. We shall examine three periods, beginning with the most recent.
From Bain to the present day
Starting from the contribution of Joe Bain (1956) , who studied at Harvard, industrial economics provided the following answer to our question: 'The causes of firms' market power are entry barriers'. In other words, the notion of entry barriers was used to explain the existence of monopoly power. So, we found the category our research was looking for in economic theory: entry barriers explain the presence of market power. We still have to ask ourselves if the history of this category had already been written. In fact, a history focused on the specific subject of the notion of entry barriers already exists, 60 and to put it briefly, is the following:
Everything starts from Bain, who found entry barriers in economies of scale, product differentiation, and the absolute cost advantages of established firms. It should be noted that for Bain entry barriers allow incumbents to 'persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the industry' (Bain 1956, p. 3). So for Bain, profits above the normal level were a sign of the existence of entry barriers. 61 For our own research, it is important to emphasise that independently of Bain, and in the same period, Sylos Labini (1957) studied the relationship between the number of firms and market power, also using the concept of entry barriers. 62 Stigler (1968) , from Chicago, attacking Bain's definition, defined entry barriers as a cost advantage of the firm already in the industry compared to those seeking to enter, thus detaching them from above-normal profits. With the two different definitions of Bain and Stigler, a controversy arose 63 on the issue of which concrete situations act as entry barriers. 64 60 On entry barriers in the history of economic thought starting from Bain there are the works of Keppler (2008) and Rosado Cubero (2008). However, the main information set down here can be drawn from textbooks of industrial economics. As well as on the usefulness of the concept. Some exponents of the Chicago School wholly rejected the concept of entry barrier, e.g. Bork (1978, From Salop (1979) onwards, non-legal entry barriers were classified as 'innocent' and 'strategic', the former of a structural type, and hence exogenous, the latter activated by the incumbent, and hence endogenous. 65 Basing itself on this theoretical categorisation, industrial economics first defined the causes of market power according to the structure-conduct-performance approach, 66 and then, starting from the 1980s, according to the 'new industrial economics'. For the former, monopoly power is a function of the degree of concentration of an industry, 67 and depends on the existence of exogenous entry barriers. 68 For the latter, it is not a function of the concentration, 69 and depends on both exogenous and endogenous entry barriers. Notice that the latter are strategic barriers, so they imply competitive behaviour by the firm, akin to the activities to compete found by the classicals and those marginalists of whom we spoke in the section on competition. 70 Ch. 16), Demsetz (1982) and Posner (1979, p. 929); the latter calls entry barriers 'colourful characterizations'. Even more critical were the representatives of the Neo-Austrian School, for whom 'most of these alleged barriers have proven to be economies and efficiencies that leading firms have earned in the market-place' (Armentano 1999, p. 13).
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See also Shepherd (1995, p. 303): 'I have assembled […] some 14 sources of entry barriers which the literature has identified. They derive both from "exogenous" causes (that is, basic conditions such as technology) and "endogenous" conditions (that is, voluntary actions taken by the incumbent firms so as to make entry harder) '. 66 Some (for example Shepherd 2007, p. 209) hold that we owe this approach to Edward Mason, and thus to an age prior to the one under consideration in this section; we shall deal with Mason in the next section 1.2.4.2. 67 The degree of concentration provides indications on size (of market share) of firms present in an industry. 'An industry is concentrated if a small number of firms controls a large part of the economic activity of the entire sector' (Grillo and Silva 1989, p. 250).
68
The Chicago School opposed this approach, in particular Demsetz, Posner and Friedman, for whom the greater size of firms is a sign of greater efficiency, not market power (Martin 2007, pp. 39-43). The same position was taken by the Neo-Austrian School, for which 'a firm's market share is not its market power, but a reflection of its overall efficiency' (Armentano 1999, p. 18).
69
Hence for this approach the number and size of firms are not necessarily correlated to market power. 70 The similarity of these two conceptions is examined in Mosca (2016a).
From the birth of industrial organisation to the 1950s
All this is widely known, but less well known is the way in which monopoly power was explained before the introduction of the category of entry barrier. In this section, we examine the period from the 1930s to Bain (1956) . Although there is a large historiography on this period, 71 it does not focus on the specific subject of the sources of market power, being devoted to tracing the birthplaces of industrial economics. Among them we cite only the three that seem to us the most significant: one is in the United Kingdom with J. Robinson (1933) and Lerner (1934) , the other two are in the United States, the first at Harvard with E. Chamberlin (1933) and E.S. Mason (1939) , the second at Chicago with H. Simons (1934) . The interrelationships between the protagonists of these three groups over the two decades would deserve an entire study. Here, however, we just try to extrapolate the answers they provided to the questions that interest us; that is, 'What are the impediments to entry?' 'Do incumbents have monopoly power?'. We recall that in this period the latter was usually represented by a downward sloping demand curve for the firm. 72 To begin with we can state that the controversies between these three schools do not seem to be about the specific subject of obstacles to entry. It is well known that the models of J. Robinson (1933) and Chamberlin (1933) are characterised by product differentiation; and it is likewise well known that this impediment to entry has both exogenous and endogenous features. 73 On the basis of this theory, Chamberlin (1937) Keppler (1994a) and Marcuzzo (2003) are focused specifically on the decades examined in this section.
72
It seems to us that the representation of market power through a downward sloping demand curve is already contained in the following words of Sraffa (1926, p. 543): 'This necessity of reducing prices in order to sell a larger quantity of one's own product is only an aspect of the usual descending demand curve, with the difference that instead of concerning the whole of a commodity, whatever its origin, it relates only to the goods produced by a particular firm'. Chamberlin (1933) , Robinson (1933) , and Lerner (1934) use downward sloping demand curves for the individual firm. Mason (1939) rejects the analytical tools, including this representation, on the basis of them being empirically inapplicable.
73
Shepherd (1991) includes in the list of the factors that produce exogenous entry barriers 'Product differentiation (occurring naturally among products)' (p. 53) and in the one for endogenous entry barriers the 'Selling expenses, including advertising (to increase the degree of product differentiation)' (p. 54).
complex position on free entry, 74 while J. Robinson 75 provides other examples of limitations to entry, both endogenous 76 and exogenous. 77 And while it is true that Mason focuses on technological factors, 78 it is only because he believes that these and no others can be found empirically. 79 On the other hand, Simons states that firm size is determined by exogenous factors, such as economies of scale, as well as by endogenous factors. 80 It is not surprising therefore, that Bain in 1956 considered it obvious that before him economies of scale had been recognised by everyone, irrespective of the school they belonged to, as a deterrent to entry. 81 As for the relationship between obstacles to entry and monopoly power, J. Robinson and Chamberlin both agree that a firm's demand curve can be perfectly elastic also in the presence of obstacles to entry, 82 74 He states in fact that, 'With respect to the particular product produced by any individual firm under monopolistic competition, there can be no 'freedom of entry' whatever […] [but] there can be freedom of entry only in the sense of a freedom to produce substitutes; and in this sense freedom of entry is universal, since substitutes are entirely a matter of degree' (Chamberlin 1937, p. 567). Martin (2007, p. 32) argues that if on the one hand at Harvard it was believed that economic forces also influenced market structure, at Chicago up until the 1950s the role of technology was recognised as determining firm size (p. 38).
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He also points out that, whereas judgement on large firms due to these economies in the UK was positive, the USA (Chicago included) was against concentration (Bain 1956, pp. 59-61).
82
The subject is barely mentioned in J. Robinson ([1933] 1937, p. 566): 'The case of a small number of firms selling in a perfect market raises some whereas they disagree on the importance of the number of firms in determining profit levels. 83 Lerner (1934) criticises the idea that the degree of monopoly is based on the number and relative size of sellers; for him, market power exclusively depends on the availability of substitutes (which is reflected in the elasticity of the firm's demand). 84 And, however ironic it may seem, Mason, the founder of the structure-conductperformance approach, shows that 'Data on numbers […] tell us little regarding price and production policies' (1939, p. 64), whereas Simons (1936), the father of the Chicago School, attributes fundamental importance to firm size in the generation of market power (Martin 2007, p. 33).
These groundbreaking contributions published in the first half of the 1930s gave rise to a number of writings by scholars such as Kalecki ), and many others. To sum up, and reporting at the same time the situation described by Scitovsky in 1950, all of them recognise the existence of both exogenous and endogenous impediments to entry; 85 nevertheless, not all believe that they generate monopoly power.
Can it be argued that this state of affairs was simply due to the fact that the problem of the relation between free entry and market power had not been fully focused on? This is what the three innovators in the theory of oligopoly think, when they complain about the confusion reigning in the literature on conditions of entry before they appeared on the scene. 86 difficulties, which are not here discussed'. By contrast, Robinson (1934, pp. 104-111) and Chamberlin (1937, p. 566) state that the impediments to entry are entirely compatible with perfect competition, on condition that the demand curve for the firm is perfectly elastic. See Dos Santos Ferreira (2012, p. 209), 'the indefinitely raising elasticity of the supplied good to rival goods in other markets […] is completely independent of market shares being small: even a monopolist is threatened by the existence of close substitutes to his output'. 
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According to Elzinga and Mills (2011, p. 558) the Lerner index is 'appropriate for assessing monopoly power of a firm […] in homogeneous -or differentiated -product oligopolies, with or without free entry, and in homogeneous-product markets with a dominant firm'. 85 It is worth remembering that, before Bain, Scitovsky (1950) showed a specific interest in the sources of market power, and in particular on the role of ignorance as entry barrier. 86 We are obviously referring to Bain, Sylos Labini and Modigliani. Bain (1956, p. vi) illustrates how on the subject of 'condition of entry' received theory Martin's thesis (2007) nonetheless seems to us more convincing; according to this, the real opposition between schools of industrial economics only began in the 1960s, 87 after the attacks of the second Chicago School 88 (which, again according to Martin, the game theory approach finally proved wrong).
Before the 1930s
If from the historiography on industrial economics indirect references to the causes of market power can be drawn, we cannot avail ourselves of most of it for the years prior to the 1930s, which is considered the pre-history of this discipline. But since it is obvious that the ideas of the 1930s did not come from nowhere, we found some interesting references in those few works that go further back. 89 Despite the great dissatisfaction often expressed about the state of the ideas formulated up until the 1930s on the subject of the causes of monopoly power, 90 we have drawn up a list of those earlier economic theorists who made contributions on was 'in extremely rudimentary form'. Also, Sylos Labini ([1957] 1962, p. 9) writes that 'the analysis of the relationship between the process of concentration and market form is in a completely unsatisfactory state'; he also explains that, concerning 'the market power of very large industrial concerns […] apart from the rather elementary observations of Smith and Marx, we are still in need of a really satisfactory theoretical analysis' (p. 11). And Modigliani (1958, p. 216) notes that 'little systematic attention [had] been paid […] to the role of entry, that is, to the behaviour of potential competitors'. However, Modigliani alludes to a previous literature, though without specifying which, writing that the entry barriers that 'Bain labels "absolute cost advantages" […] have already been extensively analysed and understood in the received body of theory' and that the barrier 'resulting from the inability of potential competitors to produce a commodity that is a perfect substitute for the product of existing firms -is again one that has received considerable attention in the past' (Modigliani 1958, p. 231). It will be remembered that the literature following on from the 1950s has always pointed to this period as the origin for the thinking on the causes of market power. 87 This seems to us convincing despite the undeniable divergences between imperfect competition and monopolistic competition of which White (1936) speaks. 88 We are referring to the above cited diatribe on the definition of entry barriers and to the attack on the structure-conduct-performance approach by Stigler, Friedman, Coase, Posner, and others. 89 These works will be cited in the course of this section, the most important being those included in De Jong and Shepherd (2007).
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For example, according to Nti and Shubik (1979) the study of entry in oligopoly theory was not dealt with before the brief treatment in Chamberlin (1933) . precisely this subject. As we shall see, these contributions are seldom cited in the existing literature on the history of industrial organisation more generally, or in the literature on the various histories of certain aspects of economic thought that we have looked at in the preceding sections of this chapter.
We begin with the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, for whom the causes of monopoly were: 'engrossing, forestalling, regrating, illicit agreements, secret pacts, conspiracies, bidders' rings'. 91 Later, in the mid seventeenth century, the Dutchman Graswinkel argued that 'monopoly is not to be feared when there are many, but few' (1651, p. 158). 92 A century further on, Cantillon (1755), standing in opposition to Graswinkel, stated that the number of competitors was not essential for rivalry to occur. 93 Moving on to the classical economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Smith (1776) is cited by this historiography, too, as by that on competition, for having identified situations where supply is persistently scarce compared to demand. 94 Beyond these natural barriers, Smith advances other causes of market power, related to imperfect information, and to technologies (I. 7. 22) which he considers a temporary cause (I. 7. 21). He is often remembered also for having shown that a small number of entrepreneurs facilitate coalitions, 95 and for having highlighted their propensity to come to agreements among themselves. 96 Recently there has been discussion on how Smith's monopolists used strategies to enforce their legal barriers to entry. 97 We have already recalled the role attributed by J.S. Mill (1848) to 'custom' as a restraint on competition; 98 he is also cited for 'the baneful effect of small numbers on the vigour of competition' 99 The sources of monopoly powerof economies of scale. 100 There is also Marx (1867), who is cited for the idea that the conspicuous 'minimum capital necessary to start up production at sufficiently low costs […] creates a "natural" hindrance to competition'. 101 We also recall Marx's law of concentration of capital.
As far as marginalist thinking is concerned, the work of Dupuit (1854a; 1854b) is mentioned for having found some deterrents to entry in the transport sector; 102 C. Menger (1871) for having considered monopoly an outcome of the limited size of markets; 103 and H.C. Adams (1887) for the effects on market structure of increasing returns to scale. 104 Marshall (1890) deserves a place to himself: on the specific subject of monopoly power, on the one hand his anthropomorphic theory of the growth of the firm, and the metaphor of the trees of the forest are regarded as unsuitable to deal with the phenomenon of large-scale industrial concentrations. 105 On the other hand, he is also acknowledged for having identified the causes of the slope of a firm's demand curve, 106 and for his insights on the effect of advertising expenditure on economies of scale and on the significance of strategic barriers to entry. 107 We continue with Hadley (1896), who is considered in this literature for having focused on the importance of fixed costs 108 and on the effects of Joan Robinson ([1933] 1969, p. 50) writes, citing Marshall, 'Its elasticity will depend upon many factors, of which the chief is the number of other firms selling the same commodity and the degree to which substitution is possible, from the point of view of buyers, between the output of other firms and the output of the firm in question. If there are few or no other firms producing closely similar commodities, the distribution of wealth among buyers, the conditions of supply of rival commodities, the conditions of supply of jointlydemanded commodities, and all the innumerable factors which affect the demand for any one commodity will influence the demand curve for the individual producer'. Sylos Labini ([1957] 1962, p. 51) comments on this that, according to Marshall, with the passing of time 'the demand schedule becomes more rigid'. make every entrepreneur a monopolist within a limited class and region', and for the statement that at the same time 'there is no monopoly which is not confined to a limited class or region'. 126 As can be seen the list is not a short one and the causes of monopoly power are all there, exogenous and endogenous: strategies, economies of scale, absolute cost advantages, product differentiation, conditions of demand (elasticity and market size). There is also the idea that the number of firms may not affect market power or even that the entry barriers in the long run may not be effective at all. However, the literature examined above says little about the role the authors of the period before the 1930s played in respect to the uncovering of the causes of monopoly power. What is said amounts to no more than vague, random fragments, lacking a background of systematic study or interpretation.
WHERE TO SEARCH?
The historiography relative to the four fields we have analysed so far has never focused specifically on the subject of the causes of market power before the 1930s, thereby leaving a gap that we believe requires filling. In the light of the review we have just carried out of the literature on competition on the one hand and on the pre-history of industrial economics on the other, we may well ask ourselves at this point in which direction we should be concentrating our research in order to start writing a history of ideas on the sources of monopoly power.
Why not Begin with the Classicals?
The information we have gathered from the secondary literature tells us that the causes found by the classicals were in part endogenous, due to strategies carried out in order to compete, and in part exogenous, the fruit of constraints independent of the firms' intentions. These constraints, we have argued, were held to be mainly short run; 127 in fact, the literature insistently recalls that in classical thinking restraints on competition had 126 Hotelling (1929, p. 44), cit. in Chamberlin ([1933] , 1956, p. 6).
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The term 'mainly' refers to the fact that, for example for Smith, certain factors of production could be scarce 'forever' (Smith 1776, I. 7. 24); see also Salvadori and Signorino (2014). J.S. Mill also believed that certain obstacles would last in the long run, for example: custom, the combinations 1976, p. 546), and also natural monopolies (Mosca 2008) . no importance in the long run. 128 The monopoly power resulting from competitive strategies was hence considered by the classicals to be always present, but continuously threatened by competition, both actual and potential, except of course in the case of temporary exogenous obstacles. 129 We also need to add that such a conception was valid for the classicals in theory as well as in reality, 130 which means that competition was considered a widespread phenomenon, on condition the market was free from legal restraints. 131 This optimism is further confirmed by the fact that in their writings the specific subject of monopoly takes up very little room. 132 If the market power that the firms obtained through strategic behaviour did not worry the classicals because it was perpetually threatened, and if that due to exogenous obstacles did not go beyond the horizon of a short run that they judged unimportant, then it is clear that a detailed, coherent examination of the causes of monopoly power cannot be found in their thinking. Hovenkamp (1989a, p. 149): 'Classicism's faith that potential competition would discipline incipient monopolists was based largely on its concepts of market entry barriers. Classical political economy recognized only government restrictions as barriers to competitive market entry'. It would be correct to add: in the long run. 130 Schumpeter ([1954] 1976, p. 545): 'the "classics" [were] firmly convinced that the competitive case was the obvious thing'. This conviction holds true to the extent it is believed that the impediments were temporary or of small account. 131 Backhouse (1990, p. 60) notes that Smith on many occasions uses the term 'liberty' to indicate competition, and defines it precisely 'in terms of the absence of restraints'. It is interesting to note that Hovenkamp ([1989b] 1991, p. 148) indicates among the restrictions recognised by law also 'a privately created restriction on entry, either by a contract including the restricted person as a willing participant, or else by a combination directed at other people as target'. 132 Stigler (1987, p. 532): 'Demsetz has counted only one page in 90 devoted to monopoly in The Wealth of Nations and only one in 500 in Mill's Principles of Political Economy. Indeed, the world "monopoly" was usually restricted to grants by the sovereign'.
Why Begin with the Age of the Marginalists?
The reasons we have just illustrated direct us towards the age of the marginalists, and this is what the secondary literature does on subjects akin to ours. 133 But why this particular age?
We can find a general answer in the history of the sciences. In his obituary for Pareto, Pantaleoni (1923, p. 582) writes: 'The rate at which physical, biological, historical and economic science have been progressing in the last seventy years has precedents only in the times of the Renaissance'. In economic analysis in particular this has involved the attempt to use a truly scientific approach based on principles of marginal utility and productivity. Another answer can certainly be found in economic history. New phenomena such as trusts, cartels, mergers, the vertical integration of firms, public utilities, and the railways, 134 raised new problems. Compared to the world of the classicals, the provisional character of the hindrances to competition no longer seemed to apply; 135 in fact, the short run in some industries seemed to be very long, and in certain cases to enter a market turned out to be very difficult also in the absence of legal barriers. 136 Faced with these new phenomena, economists tried to understand why in certain markets firms continued to be few, if they should be worried about their size, or if this was on the contrary an advantage, 137 or whether one could count on their reciprocal rivalry. 138 These questions gave rise to a quantity of studies on the subject of market power that was, as the review of the literature already provided has shown, without precedent. 139 133 For example, De Jong and Shepherd write about industrial economics: 'There was major pioneering from the 1870s on' (2007, p. xxiii). Hovenkamp (1989a, p. 105), on dealing with the debates on the subject of antitrust, focuses on the 'waning years of the nineteenth century' and also Morgan (1993), dealing with competition, concentrates on this period.
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These subjects are dealt with in Hovenkamp (1989a).
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Hovenkamp (1989a, pp. 144 ff.) writes that in this age doubts began to be voiced about the classical idea that the savings of big firms were transferred on to consumers, and also that potential competition was always at work. The latter is the idea that DiLorenzo and High (1988) attribute to the economists of the marginalist age. From a methodological perspective, how were these problems dealt with? It is well known that the years at the turn of the century were a kind of crossroads for a variety of different positions, in which the already bitter controversies between old classical thought and the new ideas of the historical school also had to face the marginalist paradigm that was making headway. The historiography on the subject of industrial economics shows that for a long time in the thought of this period, classical theory co-existed with historical analyses based on the examination of cases and on statistics, as it did with marginalist ideas that were slowly gaining ground. 140 The historians of the theory of competition also point out this co-existence. 141 So, we do not find a pure neoclassical theory in this period, 142 but rather methodological contaminations that gave rise to a great wealth of ideas, as has already been shown through our account in the previous sections.
One significant aspect which helps to explain why it is worthwhile concentrating our analysis on the age of marginalism concerns the history of the analytical tools used by economists. We recall that Cournot, Dupuit, Ellet, Von Thünen and others 143 had used mathematical tools, leaving their methods and their results to those who came after them: demand functions, cost curves, and equilibrium conditions were available at the end of the century for use in economic analysis. Some of the theoretical developments on the causes of monopoly power also came about through the logical necessity imposed by the analytical tools employed. 144 This turn of the century preoccupation with the problem of monopoly and its causes came about for two different kinds of reason. The first, 140 Hovenkamp (1989a, p. 116): 'The earliest economic studies of the trust problem were dominated by broad, historically based inquiries', while Schumpeter notes, concerning the marginalists, that 'To a surprising extent they continued to look upon the competitive case as [in the preceding period, but] they complemented this vision by an analysis that was far superior to that of the "classics"' ([1954] 1976, p. 892).
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'For three decades prior to 1920 a bifurcation period existed' (Machovec 1995, p. 97) . The many different positions on the subject of competition present in this period in the US is the subject of Morgan (1993).
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The construction of the neoclassical paradigm was a slow process, and the 'purification' of economic theory in the sense of reductionism occurred still more gradually. On reductionism in economics see Zamagni (2000) . 143 On which see Niehans (1990) and Ekelund and Hébert (1999) . 144 De Jong and Shepherd write that in this period in industrial economics 'basic concepts were invented as the new "neo-classical" microeconomic theory rapidly emerged' (2007, p. xix).
linked to method, is that with the emergence of the notion of perfect competition, all strategic behaviour of firms became a sign of monopoly power, and as such was a cause for concern. The second, on the other hand, relates to the new economic situation in which market power, whether generated by strategies or obstacles, showed itself to be long lasting, which also created anxiety, although for other reasons. The difference between the two cases, however, should not be lost sight of: in the first case, the identification of monopoly power was due to a change only in the theoretical model, 145 while in the second it was to be imputed to new circumstances in the real world.
Why the Italian Marginalists?
Schumpeter, referring to the high regard in which the economists of the marginalist age were held, remarks that: 'The most benevolent observer could not have paid any compliments to Italian economics in the early 1870s; the most malevolent observer could not have denied that it was second to none by 1914'. 146 Schumpeter's glowing tribute is certainly helpful as it reinforces our belief that the economic theory of the Italian marginalists is of great merit.
There are, however, other good reasons for studying this Italian thought, and they concern the specific subject of this work. The Italian marginalists wrote a great many studies on the subject of monopoly power, 147 a problem that was not confined to the United States despite popular opinion to the contrary. 148 Many Italian economists dealt with it, in part as a reflection of American and European realities, 149 but also because of the industrial situation in Italy and the microeconomic policies followed (or indeed not followed) by Italian governments in the early decades of the twentieth century. It was the condition of Italian 145 This is Edgeworth's opinion, according to Machovec (1995, p. 288) , 'Edgeworth's dissatisfaction with the concept of zero profit […] was rooted in his realization that the new package of semantics and ideas attending the model of perfect competition were affecting how leading economists were reasoning about the market process'. 146 Schumpeter ([1954] 1976, p. 855).
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They will be mentioned in Chapter 3, section 3.2.
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Morgan (1993, p. 564, fn. 4) seems to support it, and adds that in both the UK and Germany the problem of competition between big firms was not raised, but De Jong (2007c, pp. 62-63), for example, recalls the German book Die Kartelle by Kleinwächter (1883). In this sense, also Gerber (1998). industry that encouraged thinking on the subject of monopoly power, characterised by 'participations intersecting and in succession; holdings and groups, trade union agreements, also secret ones, interlocking directories, 150 with at least some big linkers; interlocking relations between industry and the big banks; concentration of activities in the industrial triangle; districts'. 151 The massive intervention by the government in the life of firms also provoked commentary from economists, thus revealing their idea on market power in the absence of this intervention. 152 To these reasons taken from economic history, others can be added concerning the derivation of the ideas. The fact that the father of the theory of imperfect competition was Italian (Sraffa), as were two of the three founders of the new theory of oligopoly based on the notion of entry barriers (Sylos Labini and Modigliani), suggests that their ideas could have an Italian derivation. Also, the wholly Italian history of the working-out of U-shaped average cost curves, an instrument of fundamental importance for our subject, 153 encourages us to continue exploring in this direction. Moreover, the role the Italian marginalists played in the definition of the notion of natural monopoly also offers good prospects for research on the subject of monopoly power in general. 154 We conclude our line of argument by recalling, together with Modigliani, that the possibility of reading Italians in their own original language 'is open only to the "happy few"' (1958, p. 216); we therefore think it a duty and a privilege of Italians to carry out historical work on their primary sources.
The economists considered
In this book, we deal especially with four Italian marginalists: Vilfredo Pareto, Maffeo Pantaleoni, Antonio de Viti de Marco and Enrico Barone. 150 The sharing of administrators that allows big companies to form a network of connections. entity, 162 since it was precisely their frequent intellectual contact and their reciprocal influence that affected the genesis and development of the ideas on market power.
It is by no means of secondary importance for the purposes of this study that for most of their lives they were all believers in free market and free trade and that all four were politically very active. They intervened in the political life of Italy, proposing reforms both in their works, as well as through direct participation: two were members of parliament (De Viti de Marco and Pantaleoni), and two tried to get elected (Barone and Pareto). Their period of militancy lasted from the mid-1880s to the arrival of fascism in 1923-24, 163 a time when, as we have noted already, issues concerning monopoly power dominated economic thinking; and since all four were free market and free trade economists, issues related to competition policies and market power feature prominently in their writings.
It is perhaps helpful to recall the reasons for their reputations, beginning with Pareto's everlasting fame due mainly to the concepts of Paretian optimum, of ordinal utility, to his law of income distribution, and in general to his contributions to Walras' theory of general economic equilibrium. 164 Pantaleoni is considered the first economist to have applied the marginalist analysis to public finance, 165 in 1883. He was the author of a textbook on pure economics, which led him to be called 'the Italian Marshall' for the role it played in the Italian culture, 166 and he wrote other very innovative works. 167 The fame of De Viti de Marco is mainly due to the foundation of Scienza delle Finanze as a purely theoretical discipline, as well as his important contributions to the theory of banking, international economics and the history of economic 162 The subject of the Italian marginalists seen as a distinct intellectual tradition will be discussed in the conclusive chapter of this book. It was briefly dealt with in Mosca (2015b) . 163 After that time the only survivor of the four, De Viti de Marco, remained silent for two decades, drafting his textbook on Scienza delle Finanze. These aspects will be dealt with in Chapter 5. 164 Knight ([1921b] 1964, p. 6) considered Pareto 'the most prominent exponent of the mathematical method'. 165 Pantaleoni (1883) has priority over Emil Sax (1884); see Mosca (2010) . 166 The quotation, which comes from the Italian economist Umberto Ricci, is reported in Groenewegen (1998, p. 45). 167 Pantaleoni's fame in his age is also attested by the following statement by Knight (1921b Knight ( , 1964 , p. 6): 'Among "literary" pure theorists, Wicksteed, Schumpeter, and Pantaleoni stand out'. The historiography on Pantaleoni is examined in Bini (1995) and in Augello and Michelini (1997). monopolist 'classical'; 181 and Blaug attributed to him the 'definition of the beneficial effects of competition'. 182 To this list of contributions, we can add others found in specific articles by individual economists: De Viti de Marco's article (1890a) on the telephone industry; 183 Barone's insights on the development of U-shaped cost curves, 184 the concept of natural monopoly, 185 and the theory of competition; 186 Pantaleoni's adherence to Spencer's evolutionism 187 and his interest in coalitions. 188 As can be seen, our economists' contributions seem very promising; however, no scholar has yet dealt with the specific subject of monopoly power in their thought.
The international diffusion of their ideas
Another important reason why these four Italian marginalists were chosen is that they were leading figures on the international scene, placing Italy at the centre of contemporary debates on economic theory and practice. For personal reasons, they were cosmopolitan, 189 and this certainly helped them find a place in the cultural cross-fertilisation of the period. They engaged in correspondence with economists throughout the world, and their work was reviewed in the best journals, in which they in turn published articles and reviews; their textbooks were translated into various languages. 190 The secondary literature confirms that Italian ideas made up a conspicuous proportion of those circulating among the 181 economists of the marginalist age; 191 there are therefore good reasons for asking ourselves if their thinking gained currency on the specific subject of monopoly power.
We shall also be evaluating their influence at the international level on the economic thought of the generations that followed them, and the outlook is promising because there is already some encouraging evidence available. The first regards Knight, mentioned previously for his exposition of the theory of perfect competition, who would appear to owe his 'rigorous notion of equilibrium' precisely to Pareto and Barone. 192 Further evidence concerns the influence of Pantaleoni's theory of fixed costs on J.M. Clark 193 and, through him, on the following theories of competition. De Viti de Marco inspired entire areas of research, 194 and there is evidence of derivations from his ideas on the subjects of monopolistic power and the regulation of public utilities. 195 There is also a thread that from Pareto leads to Lerner, via Amoroso, and to Lerner's famous index to measure market power, even though there is no proof of direct influence. 196 
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has shown that there is a gap in the secondary literature regarding economic thinking on the sources of monopoly power before the 1930s. We have looked at the literature on the history of different topics (models of profit maximisation in non-competitive markets, antitrust, competition and industrial organisation) to find out which kind of limitation to entry economists before Bain (1956) took into account, the role these economists attributed to the number of firms present in the market, and their ideas on potential competition. The economists offering 191 a promise under the terms of our enquiry were found to be from the Italian marginalist school of economic thought: Vilfredo Pareto, Maffeo Pantaleoni, Antonio de Viti de Marco and Enrico Barone. Having outlined the achievements and influence of the quartet, the next chapter addresses in more detail their theory and their vision of competition.
